In much of the literature on the information society, its defining charac teristic is assumed to be its immateriality. That is to say, as our inter actions and activities become less dependent on the movement of atoms and more focused on the manipulation of bits, they seem less limited by the con straints of physical reality. But when we look closely at the material under pinnings of the information economy-from the minerals that make up digital devices to the massive amounts of energy and water required to power data centers-it becomes clear that information technologies are firmly grounded in the physical environment. In fact, information tech nologies continuously shape not only the physical environment but also representations of the relationship between natural and built worlds.
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In his 1995 best seller Being Digital, the high-tech visionary and MIT professor Nicholas Negroponte predicted the triumph of the infor mational over the material. The driving force behind the impending digital revolution, according to Negroponte, was the superiority of bits over atoms. In earlier eras the dissemination of information required the movement of physical material (atoms), and traffic on the digital in formation superhighway was entirely made up of weightless, immaterial bits, all of them traveling at the speed of light in a frictionless environ ment. Whereas the movement of atoms was expensive, the distribution of bits was effectively cost-free: as a result, Negroponte argued, the "rapid exponential shift from atoms to bits" in modern economic, social, and political life was both "inevitable and unstoppable." Negroponte was only one of many pundits in this period suggesting that the defining characteristic of the digital economy was its essential "weightlessness."
2 From John Perry Barlow to Alan Greenspan to the edi tors of Wired Magazine, claims about the "dematerialization" of informa tion dominated the discussion about digital technology. 3 Whether one was arguing for the deregulation of telecommunications networks or the achievement of a posthumanist utopia, the fundamental assumption was that, with the development of digital technologies, information had been "rendered free from the material constraints that govern[ed] the mate rial world." 4 Indeed, such claims date back at least from the mid1970s, when the sociologist Daniel Bell introduced the notion of the postindustrial economy into popular discourse. The postindustrial economy would be characterized, according to Bell, by a shift from manufacturing to service, from production to consumption, and from the material to the informational. 5 In his 1977 Pulitzer Prize-nominated book, James Martin described this brave new world as the "Wired Society," making explicit the connection between the postindustrial economy and recent developments in digital technology. 6 In anticipation of Negroponte's "atoms-to-bits" argument, Martin predicted that the inexpensive and instantaneous connectivity made possible by information technology (a phenomenon that Frances Cairncross would later call the "death of dis tance") would allow for a radical restructuring of both social and geo graphical relationships. 7 In fact, for Martin, the ultimate result of this newfound freedom would be a postindustrial return to preindustrial patterns of rural settlement. Freed from the need to engage in physi cally embodied forms of information exchange, humans would choose country over city and would return to a simpler, more local, and more pastoral existence.
Many scholars have challenged the digital utopian vision. 8 The post industrial society has not materialized (or dematerialized) in the ways predicted; efforts to ship bit-producing labor overseas have alternately reduced opportunities in the nation where the digital revolution was purportedly born and demonstrated the difficulties and limitations of disaggregating computer-mediated work across globally dispersed social contexts. Barlow ultimately sold his ranch and moved to the city. While the rise of computer networks has enabled new patterns of work, it has not stopped the growth of megacities, nor has it radically reshaped the relationships between built and natural environments.
Or has it? Today people navigate cities, roadways, and wilderness us ing global positioning systems. Our understanding of the most press ing environmental problem of our time-global climate change-would be extremely limited without the assistance of massive databases and complex programs for simulation. 9 While much has been written about the role of computing in reshaping work practices, as well as limitations to such changes, scholars have yet to systematically evaluate the role of in formation technology in environmental change. The essays in this issue examine these important themes, showing that information technology has both impacted physical environments in ways little acknowledged by digital utopians and contributed to new representations of and interven tions into the relationship between built and natural environments.
As Christophe Lécuyer's article, "From Cleanrooms to Dirty Water: Labor, Semiconductor Firms, and the Struggle over Pollution and Workplace Hazards in Silicon Valley," reminds us, even in the heart of the postindustrial digital economy, workers and labor activists soon discov ered that atoms and bits were not so easy to disentangle. Although the semiconductor firms that provided the region with its name had long represented themselves as a "clean" industry, their impact on the envi ronment and human health was not less significant than their impact on the digital economy but simply less visible. As the largely female and immigrant laborers in Silicon Valley fabrication plants began to suffer from acid burns, chemical sensitivity, and higher than normal rates of breast and other cancers, it became increasingly clear that, despite the lack of obvious smokestacks, factory work in the new economy was not so different from factory work in the earlier industrial economy. The staggeringly expensive "cleanrooms" in microchip fabrication plants were meant to protect components, not people. By the early 1980s it had become increasingly clear that the underground tanks used to store the toxic by-products of semiconductor manufacture were leaking into the groundwater, meaning that even those working in the more abstract, information-oriented occupations in Silicon Valley were not immune to the effects of postindustrial industrial manufacturing. By the end of the 1980s the Environmental Protection Agency had identified twenty-nine Superfund sites in Santa Clara County, the single largest concentration of such sites in the nation. The story Lécuyer tells is as much about con tinuity with industrial modes of production as it is about change to a postindustrial society. The themes that he explores are industrialera concerns about worker safety, collective bargaining, and environmental degradation. Their surprising familiarity throws into stark relief the selfserving narratives told by high-tech employers about the unprecedented immateriality of the information economy. 10 Today most of the manufacturing activities that proved so toxic to Santa Clara County have been relocated to other parts of the world, thus rendering their environmental costs and impacts even less visible to their primary consumers and beneficiaries. But all of the material components of our digital devices come from somewhere, and the story about how they get from there to here-in other words, the history of the global supply chain of the digital economy-can be used to connect the history of computing to a larger history of the environment. At the most basic level, the minerals that make up these components must be extracted from the ground, often at great cost to both human health and the envi ronment. Some of these minerals-tin, for example-are dangerous to humans and animals alike and are associated with widespread ecological disasters; others, such as lithium, are concentrated in parts of the world with a long history of colonial and postcolonial exploitation of the envi ronment. 11 In the case of the rare earth elements, essential to both the information technology and alternative fuels industries, the centraliza tion of control in the hands of a small number of nations raises a specter of contentious geopolitical conflict that rivals that of the petrochemical economy. 12 Even after these minerals are successfully collected and transported, they must be cleaned and decontaminated in processes that require mas sive amounts of water, electricity, and chemicals and that produce large amounts of toxic byproducts that must be stored or otherwise disposed of. 13 Much of this work is concentrated in the massive industrial cities of southern China, which further exacerbates the rate of environmental degradation.
14 And these industrial pollutants are but part of a much larger problem of electronic waste (e-waste) that implicates the entire digital economy in the transnational flow of toxic materials that dis proportionately affects the environment and citizens of the developing world. 15 In computer graveyards in places such as Agbogbloshie, Ghana, carcinogens such as lead, mercury, arsenic, cadmium, and chlorinated dioxins are dumped directly into landfills, contaminating both the lo cal soil and the groundwater supply. 16 While such stories are tragic, they are nevertheless familiar. This is the history of industrial capitalism, re capitulated and transformed within the information economy.
As Lécuyer's presentation of this history makes clear, there are good reasons why information technology firms work to conceal their physi cal presence and material reality under the cloak of ethereal metaphors such as the "cloud." 17 The rhetoric of the cloud implies lightness, imma teriality, and impermanence. But when we look closely at the underlying technologies that make the cloud possible-from copper wires to under water cables to coal-fired electrical generators-it is revealed to be sim ply a reconfigured network of industrial-era physical infrastructures. 18 At the nodes of this network sit large warehouses full of electronics equip ment, all of which require large amounts of energy to run and water to cool. 19 In the past few years media scholars have productively explored the materiality of this information infrastructure, and it is to this litera ture that Julie Cohn's article, "Data, Power, and Conservation: The Early Turn to Information Technologies to Manage Energy Resources," con tributes most directly. 20 In her article, Cohn focuses on the role of information technology in mediating between a potent engine and symbol of modernityelectrification-and the natural environment upon which it relies, in cluding coal deposits and rivers. Throughout the twentieth century, electrification helped to define the boundary between built and natural environments through the development of mining infrastructure, the construction of hydroelectric dams, and the development of electrified environments that aim to protect humans from the caprice of nature. Cohn demonstrates the centrality of information technology to this pro cess as it has unfolded in the United States. Beginning in the early twen tieth century, the US electricity industry used information technology to help deliver electricity with increasing physical efficiency, thereby con suming fewer natural resources per watt of power delivered. However, the specific goals of conservation shifted throughout the twentieth cen tury, from Progressive Era concerns with natural resource management, to increasing defensive industrial productivity for World War II, to the postwar faith in ever-cheaper electrification as the source of American prosperity and progress. As Cohn notes, the recent notion of conser vation-a focus on a net decrease and even elimination of natural re source consumption-marks a significant departure from all earlier understandings. For most of the twentieth century, information technol ogy made electrification systems more efficient but did not decrease the net consumption of resources; on the contrary, one means of increasing efficiency was to increase consumption, thereby gaining economies of scale. Contemporary efforts to make the electrical grid "smart" continue many decades of developing information technology that can improve efficiency but are driven by a relatively new understanding of the ulti mate goals of such improvements: to reduce and even eliminate the use of nonrenewable natural resources such as coal. There has always been a close connection between electrical and information infrastructures, but this has become even closer in recent decades. 21 It is particularly appropriate that Cohn focuses on the electrical grid as a form of information infrastructure, because as the historian Thomas Hughes notes in response to Nicholas Negroponte, the absolutely es sential element of digital technology is not the bit but the electron. 22 You can have electronic digital computers without binary digits, but you can not have them without electricity. And the energy requirements of the information economy are astounding: according to a recent Greenpeace report, if the cloud were a country, it would be the sixth largest energy consumer on the planet. 23 The collective global demand for power for digital data centers accounts for the output of roughly thirty nuclear power plants, with server farms in the United States accounting for as much as one-third of this total load. In 2011 Google data centers alone used more than 2.3 billion kilowatthours of electricity, which repre sented about 2 percent of the annual electricity consumption of the en tire United States. For all the talk about cyberspace as an ethereal realm of information sitting outside of physical and political geography, in re ality, data centers and server farms need to be located near inexpensive sources of power and at the nodes of energy distribution grids. When we look at the vast web of wires, cables, towers, generators, and other physi cal equipment that underlies the apparently virtual realm of cyberspace, we see that these are exactly the same forms of infrastructure required by more traditional forms of manufacturing. Seen from this perspec tive, the digital present does not seem quite so discontinuous with our industrial past. 24 Historians who specialize in technology and environment have identified at least three important ways in which these two seemingly very distinct topics can be understood to interact. To begin with, they are interested in the ways in which humans use technology to shape or influence their environment. Second, they emphasize the active role that nature plays in shaping human behavior and activity. Finally, they are concerned with the ways in which technologies mediate or al ter the ways in which humans perceive and understand their environ ment. It is in this last category that we can situate Lisa Avron's article, "'Governmentalities' of Conservation Science at the Advent of Drones: Situating an Emerging Technology."
Avron examines the use of remotely piloted aircraft, also known as Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) or drones, for wildlife management and conservation. She demonstrates both continuities and changes between conservation drones and earlier information systems used to represent natural landscapes and populations in wildlife management. Today many scientists are excited about the unprecedented levels of pre cision offered by digital images collected by remotely piloted aircraft, as well as the reduced costs and hazards to humans, who no longer must risk life and limb hanging out of aircraft to take photos. Yet as Avron shows, research conducted with conservation drones continues and combines multiple rationalities governing wildlife management. While biopolitical rationalities are focused on restoring the natural en vironment to its "native" or "pure" state by eliminating "invasive" and "impure" species, neoliberal rationalities are focused on managing the natural environment in ways that enable economic growth and the devel opment of built environments. Using ethnographic research on a UAS research program in Florida, Avron shows that conceptions of "invasive" or "natural" species are shaped by a history of human development, as well as by contemporary interests in continuing that development for economic benefit. As she argues, conservation drones are information systems that "aid in transforming a native species (the Carolina willow) into an 'invasive nuisance'" by helping to quantify the costs that the water-thirsty willow imposes on the equally water-thirsty development of coastal cities in Florida.
Over the course of the past decade, the incorporation of insights drawn from environmental history has helped to reinvigorate the dis cipline of the history of technology. 25 In thinking critically about the re lationship between the natural and the built environments, historians of technology have been able to expand the scope of their discipline to include a broader range of actors and a more global perspective and sen sibility. Our goal in putting together this special issue on computing and the environment has been to provoke a similarly productive exchange within the community of scholars who study information technology.
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